The African Growth and Opportunity Act, better known as AGOA, was born in 2000 with the hope of being more than just a trade deal. Envisioned under President Bill Clinton, it was designed to be a bridge to global markets for Sub-Saharan African nations, granting them duty-free access to the United States for thousands of agricultural, textile, automotive, and mineral products. Over twenty-five years later, as September 30, 2025 approaches, AGOA’s future is hanging in the balance. A profound shift in U.S. trade policy and the geopolitical chessboard in Africa suggest that its reauthorisation may no longer be taken for granted.
Since its enactment, AGOA has played a central role in U.S.–Africa trade. But recent developments in trade policy under the Trump administration, particularly aggressive tariffs on a variety of imports have cast significant doubt on whether AGOA will be renewed or if it will survive in a meaningful form. These tariff policies are broadly seen as part of an “America First” trade posture, where trade deficit reduction, protection of domestic industries, and strategic competition with rising powers (notably China) are elevated in U.S. decision-making.
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African stakeholders are deeply aware of these pressures. U.S. Senators Chris Coons (Democrat) and James Risch (Republican) introduced the AGOA Renewal and Improvement Act of 2024 in April, aiming to extend AGOA through 2041. This bill would also introduce reforms such as moving from annual eligibility reviews of participating countries to biennial reviews, while still allowing for outside-of-cycle reviews under certain conditions.
Meanwhile, the U.S. trade landscape has been turbulent. Tariffs imposed under the Trump administration have raised concerns among AGOA beneficiary countries that even if AGOA persists formally, the benefits may be compromised. South Africa has been publicly vocal that recent tariff measures from Washington effectively erode the preferential advantages AGOA was supposed to confer.
According to the most recent U.S. International Trade Commission data, AGOA imports into the U.S. from beneficiary countries in 2024 stood at approximately US$8.0 billion, down about 13% from US$9.3 billion in 2023.
Exports under AGOA are heavily skewed towards a few countries and sectors. In a Brookings analysis of AGOA’s non-crude exports (i.e. excluding petroleum and similar raw-materials) from 2001 to 2022, South Africa leads with US$55.9 billion, followed by Nigeria with US$11.2 billion, Kenya US$7.3 billion, Lesotho US$6.8 billion, and Madagascar around US$3.6 billion.
Another critical fact is growth in non-crude AGOA exports. Although crude petroleum once dominated, exports of non-crude products have increased by 241% between 2001 and 2022, while crude exports have fallen by about 50% in the same period. This suggests that AGOA has gradually fostered more value-added trade.
For many smaller countries and economies, AGOA exports have been sizable relative to GDP. In twelve beneficiary nations (including Lesotho, Eswatini, Madagascar, Mauritius, Malawi, Kenya), AGOA non-crude exports accounted for one per cent or more of their GDP between 2001-2022. For Lesotho especially, non-crude AGOA exports made up about 16% of its GDP during that span.
What the Expiry Could Mean
If AGOA is allowed to lapse without renewal, the consequences will ripple across the continent. Textiles and apparel industries will be especially exposed. Countries like Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar and Eswatini that have built manufacturing supply chains for garments destined for the U.S. market under AGOA could face steep tariff barriers, making their exports far less competitive. Automotive sectors, particularly in South Africa, which export vehicle parts and assembled vehicles under AGOA preferences, would also suffer. Trade data show that South Africa’s exports to the U.S. surged in recent years; but newly imposed or looming tariffs risk eroding this advantage.
Mining and critical minerals represent another domain of concern. AGOA has enabled duty-free access for essential raw materials and semi-processed minerals which feed into supply chains for U.S. industries such as batteries and electronics. Without AGOA, securing these minerals, but more importantly encouraging local processing and value addition in Africa faces major obstacles.
Perhaps most pressing is the spectre of a loss in employment. While precise numbers are difficult to pin down across all sectors, several analyses estimate that AGOA has directly and indirectly supported hundreds of thousands of jobs in African beneficiary countries. This includes factory workers in textiles, workers in automotive, suppliers, logistics and in mining services. Any sudden expiration would lead to job losses, reduced foreign investment, and declining industrial growth in sectors that are among the few that have offered structural transformation.
The consequences of AGOA’s expiration are not restricted to commerce alone. They touch upon larger themes of strategic influence and policy alignment. First, U.S. soft power in Africa is at stake. AGOA has been one of the primary levers by which the United States has maintained economic engagement with the continent, particularly in contrast with competitors such as China and the European Union. If the U.S. lets AGOA lapse, or fails to sufficiently reform and extend it, that vacuum may be filled by other actors less concerned with conditionality or human rights, but more eager to secure raw materials, influence, and trade routes.
Second, eligibility under AGOA has in many cases served as an incentive for beneficiary nations to improve labour laws, governance, and market reforms. The program’s renewal has often been tied to requirements of “progress toward establishing a market-based economy” and upholding human rights and labour standards. Without a renewal, and without reforms, some nations might deprioritise these conditional incentives, reducing momentum for reforms.
Third, the continuity of AGOA is intimately bound with U.S. domestic political aims, especially under policies seeking to reduce trade deficits and ensure supply-chain resilience (e.g. for critical minerals). The Renewal and Improvement Act of 2024 explicitly references strategic minerals and aims to align AGOA more closely with U.S. economic and security priorities. Extending AGOA through 2041 would also provide longer-term certainty, encouraging investment flows that might otherwise hesitate under shorter term renewals.
Congress, Tariffs, and Trust
Despite its accomplishments, AGOA’s renewal faces significant headwinds. Legislative inertia continues to delay action. The AGOA Renewal and Improvement Act remains under review in the U.S. Senate Finance Committee after its introduction in April 2024. While it secured bipartisan support, it has not yet advanced to a full vote.
Tariff policies and protectionism under recent U.S. administrations (not just the Trump-era tariffs, but lingering rhetoric and policy uncertainty) have signalled that trade preferences may no longer enjoy the same political priority. Some African beneficiaries argue that the tariffs effectively negate the duty-free benefits, particularly in sectors like automotive and apparel where the cost margins are narrow.
There is also concern over AGOA’s design and eligibility criteria. Annual eligibility reviews, stringent rules of origin, and compliance requirements are challenging for many African countries, particularly smaller or economically weaker ones, to meet consistently. Critics argue that these constraints have led to uneven utilisation of AGOA across the continent. Only about nineteen out of 32 AGOA-eligible countries have developed national plans (“utilisation strategies”) to fully exploit AGOA’s possibilities.
What Renewing AGOA Might Look Like
If Congress acts, or if stakeholders are able to marshal sufficient political will, there are several reforms and strategic adjustments that could strengthen AGOA’s future.
An extended timeline is central. The Coons-Risch bill proposes renewing AGOA until 2041, which would provide long-term predictability for African industries and U.S. investors. Businesses in Africa and the U.S. alike prefer certainty to short-term renewals, which make planning for export capacity, infrastructure investment, and employment risky.
Easing eligibility burdens while preserving good governance. Transforming annual review cycles to biennial ones, as the proposed bill does, could allow governments and businesses more stability and reduce compliance overhead. At the same time, good governance, rights protections, and labour standards must remain central to the eligibility criteria, both to maintain moral legitimacy and to reassure U.S. policymakers.
Improving access to, and implementation of, national utilisation strategies. Encouraging more African countries to develop and regularly update these strategies, and assisting them in meeting the rules of origin and other technical requirements, would spread AGOA’s benefits more evenly. Policy tools like capacity building, trade facilitation, and investment in infrastructure are critical here.
Aligning AGOA with emerging global value chains. The trade world is changing rapidly: digital services, renewable energy components, critical minerals, processed agricultural goods all offer new opportunities. Any renewal should include mechanisms to better integrate these sectors. U.S. strategic interest in securing critical minerals, cobalt, manganese, tungsten among others aligns with growing African capacity and the imperative to build sustainable and diversified supply chains.
How AGOA Fits in the Larger Architecture
To fully appreciate what is at risk, AGOA must be seen not in isolation but as part of broader international trade and geopolitical frameworks. Since 2000, global trade has increasingly shifted toward preferential trade agreements, regional economic communities, and bilateral strategic partnerships.
China, for example, has expanded its footprint in Africa through infrastructure investment under the Belt and Road Initiative, trade deals less constrained by human-rights conditionality, and bilateral supply-chain agreements. The European Union has likewise negotiated Economic Partnership Agreements with multiple African regions. These frameworks pose both competition and contrast for AGOA, which remains essentially a preferential import regime rather than a reciprocal trade agreement.
Further, global supply chains are under stress from climate change, energy transition, and geopolitical competition over critical raw materials. Industrial policy in many African nations now aims at not just exporting raw commodities but capturing the benefits of processing, manufacturing, and technological services. AGOA can serve as a tool in this setting, if modernised. Otherwise it risks becoming a relic in a trade environment that rewards agility, sustainability, and value addition.
When the Clock Tolls
If AGOA is not renewed by its September 2025 expiry, the consequences would be severe and broad. African industries could face sudden loss of access to the U.S. market without duties for thousands of goods. Textile, apparel, automotive, and mineral processing sectors are most vulnerable, potentially losing market competitiveness overnight. FDI flows that had been predicated on AGOA’s existence may dry up, compounding unemployment and slow industrial growth.
For certain African countries, AGOA exports have been a sizeable portion of GDP. The removal of AGOA preferences could lead to contraction in economic output, increased poverty, or under-utilised industrial capacity. Countries that had developed export processing zones or supply chains targeting the U.S. market may face stranded investments.
On the U.S. side, letting AGOA lapse could mean forfeiting influence. The U.S. would lose an important mechanism to promote governance reforms and economic liberalisation in Africa. Strategic supply chains, especially for critical minerals could become more dependent on actors with less transparent practices, possibly eroding U.S. economic and security interests in the longer run.
Between Renewal and Relinquishment
AGOA has been, over its more than two decades of existence, more than a trade policy. It has represented a promise of industrialisation, jobs, trade integration, and strategic alignment. But the approaching expiry in September 2025 is not just a deadline, it is a test of whether that promise remains alive in U.S. policy, and whether African nations can still count on their oldest major preferential trade relationship.
Renewal of the act, especially through legislation like the AGOA Renewal and Improvement Act of 2024, offers a window to address structural weaknesses, realign incentives, and broaden participation. But failure to act would likely lead not just to economic loss, but to strategic drift for both the United States and Africa.
In the weeks ahead, what matters most will be how loudly African industries raise their voice, how creatively they frame the stakes in Washington, and whether U.S. policymakers see AGOA not as a relic of the past but as a tool for the kind of trade, growth, and global stability that both the U.S. and Africa need in an increasingly contested world.
