At the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, much attention naturally falls on speeches from world leaders and headline-grabbing pledges. Yet behind the scenes, the African Union (AU) worked to translate words into institutional influence, leveraging partnerships, aligning continental priorities, and pushing structural reform agendas. The meeting between H.E. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, and H.E. Annalena Baerbock, President of the UNGA session, encapsulates this less visible but strategically essential effort.
The AU’s partnership with the UN at UNGA 80 reaffirmed a shared conviction: no global challenge can be solved by single nations alone. In the joint communiqué issued by the UN, AU, and EU during their sixth trilateral meeting, the three organisations underscored that multilateralism remains “the most effective way to address today’s challenges,” particularly peace, security, and sustainable development.
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Africa’s crises dominated the joint statement. The communiqué called for renewed collective efforts to secure an immediate cessation of hostilities in Sudan, support reconciliation and development in the Sahel, revive the stalled political process in Libya, and bolster peace efforts in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia.
What this reveals is a layering of political will with institutional coordination: beyond raising Africa’s priorities before the UN, the AU is endeavouring to anchor them in joint action plans with major global actors. This is not simply symbolic: it signals Africa’s intention to move from advocacy to co-ownership of solutions.
Perhaps no arena is more consequential than that of development finance. At the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4) held in Seville from 30 June to 3 July 2025, world leaders adopted the Sevilla Commitment, a renewed global financing framework intended to bridge the gap between ambition and resources.
The document recognises a financing shortfall for achieving the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): some estimates suggest that developing countries face an approximate US $4 trillion annual gap in sustainable development funding.
For Africa, the Sevilla Commitment is both opportunity and challenge. It includes more than 130 initiatives aimed at improving debt resilience, scaling up multilateral development bank (MDB) lending, and facilitating access to climate-aligned liquidity. Among its proposals are debt-for-development swaps, pausing debt payments during climate disaster events, and expanding concessional finance to countries already under stress.
Yet critics caution that the Commitment falls short of binding rules. It does not mandate full debt cancellation, and it stops short of requiring recipient countries to access specific climate finance allocations. Still, for the AU, participation in Seville presents a lever: by aligning Africa’s Agenda 2063 and national development plans with the Commitment’s principles, the continent aims to elevate its bargaining position in global financing architecture.
On the margins of UNGA 80, African stakeholders pushed this forward. At a high-level side event titled “Reconfiguring Global Credit Rating Practices,” Claver Gatete (UN Under-Secretary-General and ECA Executive Secretary) emphasised the unfair cost of capital borne by African states, sometimes labelled an “Africa premium” in borrowing costs compared to advanced economies.
In sum, the AU is not merely joining global conversations on finance; it’s seeking to reshape its premises.
The AU’s Public Health Strategy
Another domain where the AU is acting behind the scenes is health security. On the margins of UNGA 80, the AU’s health arm, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC), convened its Extraordinary Session with Heads of State through its Committee of Heads of State and Government (CHSG).
The session reaffirmed the AU’s vision of health sovereignty: prioritising domestic resource mobilisation, scaling local manufacturing, operationalising the African Medicines Agency, and bolstering regulatory harmonisation across the continent. As the communiqué noted, financing gaps persist and must be addressed.
The CHSG also requested Africa CDC to rally former heads of state as champions for fundraising and to coordinate continental development partners so as to avoid duplication and fragmentation.
Additionally, at UNGA, the AU signed a memorandum of understanding with Uniting to Combat Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs), affirming its commitment to fight diseases that disproportionately burden vulnerable communities, over 600 million Africans are affected by NTDs.
These moves show the AU layering public health infrastructure as a strategic pillar, not just a humanitarian necessity.
Conflict, Migration, and Regional Stability
Across Africa, conflict and instability increasingly test the AU’s capacity to act beyond rhetoric. In Sudan, now deep into a third year of war, the AU-UN-EU joint communiqué demanded inclusive political dialogue and urgent cessation of hostilities. In the Sahel region, where armed groups erode state presence and frustrate development, AU coordination is pledged to be more intensive.
Libya’s stalled political roadmap received renewed support from the three organisations, alongside the urgent need to address migration under humanitarian norms. In eastern DRC, AU-backed mechanisms align with the UN Security Council resolution to stabilise the region. In Somalia, the AU’s support for the Stabilisation Mission was reasserted, with emphasis on the crucial role of predictable financing.
Through these efforts, the AU is gradually seeking to operationalise its peace and security architecture (for example, via the AU Peace and Security Council) not only to mediate conflict but to coordinate joint missions, influence political roadmaps, and consolidate regional security cooperation.
Agenda 2063 Meets the 2030 Agenda
Every major intervention by the AU is anchored to two compasses: Africa’s Agenda 2063 and the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In the joint communiqué at UNGA 80, leaders reaffirmed these as guiding frames for collaboration and alignment.
As the AU prepares for its November AU-EU Summit in Angola, that alignment is central. The Sevilla Commitment, for instance, is positioned by African leaders as a tool to unlock investment, restructure debt, and pressure reform of multilateral development banks in favour of Africa’s needs.
The AU’s insistence on the Sevilla platform of action also reflects this: through INFFs (Integrated National Financing Frameworks), countries can better integrate climate, development, and biodiversity goals into national budgets.
Moreover, the AU’s thematic priorities, women, peace, and security (marking the 25th anniversary of UNSC resolution 1325), climate justice, debt relief, and governance all form part of a united narrative that bridges continental aspirations and global frameworks.
The Gaps That Persist
Despite these substantive efforts, challenges remain. The Sevilla Commitment, while ambitious, stops short of binding obligations. It does not obligate states to cancel debt or guarantee full climate financing, and its success will hinge on how commitments are translated into implementation.
Meanwhile, the absence of the United States from the Seville negotiations raised doubts about the universality of buy-in and risked weakening global solidarity.
At home, many African countries still grapple with limited fiscal space, excessive debt burden, uneven institutional capacity, and constrained sovereign credit ratings, factors that limit their ability to leverage the global commitments effectively.
Further, in peace and security interventions, financing remains unpredictable and mandates fragile; in health, domestic resource mobilisation is uneven across states; and in climate action, adaptation funding remains far below estimated needs.
These gaps mean that the AU must not only advocate but sustain institutional capacities, track accountability, and maintain diplomatic momentum beyond UNGA.
Toward an AU That Acts, Not Just Speaks
The shift from podium diplomacy toward strategic lever-pulling is underway. At UNGA 80, the AU, through its Chairperson, its health and peace institutions, and its engagements in global financial architecture, pushed beyond the role of a reactive voice to that of a co-shaper of global agendas.
Yet this transformation will demand persistence. The AU must institutionalise follow-up mechanisms, insist on enforcement, and build the capacity to turn commitments into credible action on the ground. The AU’s success will be measured not by statements but by how it influences the shape of global institutions, the flow of finance, the resolution of conflicts, and the health and wellbeing of Africans.
In a global order under pressure, the AU’s challenge is bold: to bend the architecture toward justice, not merely to be heard from the podium.
