In mid-September 2025, Chad’s National Assembly approved constitutional revisions that extend the presidential term from five to seven years and remove term limits, allowing the president to run for office indefinitely. The amendments passed with 171 votes in favour, one abstention, and none against, and are now awaiting a Senate vote scheduled for 13 October 2025.
President Mahamat Idriss Deby, who took office in 2021 following the death of his father, has consolidated significant political influence, especially after the 2024 presidential and parliamentary elections. The reforms affect three main areas of Chad’s political structure: term length, term limits, and legislative support for the changes. Observers note that nearly all National Assembly members voted in favour, reflecting broad alignment with the executive branch. Opposition figures and civil society actors have reported that avenues for political contestation and public protest are increasingly constrained. The opposition, including Succes Masra, has seen political space steadily shrink; Masra resigned after contesting the 2024 election results and was later sentenced to twenty years in prison for incitement of violence.
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Chad’s legislative bodies are largely aligned with the president’s party, with limited representation from opposition parties. Recent analyses of the National Assembly indicate that most seats are held by parties supportive of President Deby, while the Senate similarly comprises many of his supporters or appointees. This alignment shapes the functioning of legislative debates and oversight processes. Civil society groups and political parties have reported that applications for protests or public demonstrations often face challenges. Institutions such as independent courts and constitutional councils risk being weakened under the influence of executive priorities.
The economic and social consequences of the constitutional changes are not immediately measurable, but observers note that governance structures that concentrate decision-making can affect transparency and policy implementation. For Chad, a country facing developmental challenges, regional instability, and the management of refugee flows, leadership approaches and institutional effectiveness are particularly significant.
Chad’s constitutional revisions occur within a regional context where several West and Central African countries have in the past few years, experienced coups, emergency rule, or amendments to term limits. Chad’s legislative approach is the first among the region’s states to take a formal constitutional adjustment.
Internationally, this development is likely to draw strong criticism from human rights bodies, democratic organisations, and Western governments. The African Union’s guidelines and declarations repeatedly assert term limits and constitutionalism as foundational to democracy; similarly, regional bodies such as ECOWAS (though Chad is in the CEN-SAD / ECCAS orbit) have in past reacted against overt constitutional manipulation. Under many democratic indexes Freedom House, Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), etc., such constitutional changes correlate strongly with democratic backsliding.
Geopolitically, Chad’s role in the Sahel region as a partner in counter-terrorism, its interactions with France and other external actors, its management of refugee inflows, and its position in regional alliances all mean that shifts in its governance model will be watched closely. External actors may find it harder to justify diplomatic support or aid policies where democratic legitimacy is in question.
Measuring against Standards
To understand the full significance of Chad’s amendments, one must measure them against established global frameworks and norms that govern constitutionalism, democratic governance, and human rights.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which many states are parties, embeds principles of free elections, periodic review of political power, and protections for political opposition. While term limits per se are not universally mandated by every international treaty, the spirit of equal political opportunity and periodic, free leadership review is central.
Similarly, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, adopted by the African Union, emphasises constitutionalism, respect for human rights, and regular elections. Article 23 of that Charter specifically discourages any attempt to eliminate term limits. Where states violate these norms, they risk censure, suspension from regional organisations, or sanctions.
Democratic theory also underlines the role of two interlinked principles: accountability and rotation of power. Term limits are often seen as institutional safeguards against authoritarian drift. Empirical studies suggest that in Africa, countries which modify or eliminate effective term limits tend to have leaders who remain in power for much longer periods, and that such arrangements often coincide with higher levels of corruption, lower degrees of political freedom, and weakened civil society. For instance, the Africa Center has noted that in states without term limits or where limits are circumvented, leaders remain in power for a median of 12 years, and when certain additional cases are included, the median can rise to 19 years.
What Looks Like Stability Might Be Fragile
While some in government may claim that longer terms and indefinite service bring continuity, stability, or enable long-term policy execution, history and comparative politics caution otherwise. Extended rule often engenders resistance, sometimes quietly, sometimes through overt unrest. In the absence of credible opposition or free media, discontent can build underground, increasing risks of protest or instability down the line.
In Chad’s case, the concentration of power already seems to have reduced political voice for opposition figures, curtailed public space for dissent, and raised fears among civil society about human rights and political freedoms. Whether the economic, social, and security challenges, such as managing refugees, counter-insurgency, and climate stressors will be better handled under this new constitutional arrangement remains an open question, and one that many outside observers are sceptical about.
Questions for Democracy in Chad and Beyond
As Chad moves toward formalising these constitutional changes via the Senate vote and presidential signature, several key questions arise.
How will international partners respond, through diplomacy, aid, or partnership conditionality? What will become of institutions that traditionally serve as checks, such as the judiciary, legislative minority, and media? Can political opposition reconstitute itself under more restrictive conditions? Will civil society maintain enough space to advocate, mobilise or challenge?
And, crucially, how will ordinary citizens perceive legitimacy in the long run, if leadership is unbounded, continuity may come at the cost of accountability and trust.
For democracy advocates, governance experts, regional organisations, and foreign partners, the test will now be how responses are structured, not merely in criticism, but in tangible support for resilient institutions, for voice, transparency, and legitimacy. As Chad charts this new course, the questions it poses are not only about one nation, but about what constitutionalism, accountability, and leadership mean in a world increasingly attuned to both the dangers of autocracy and the essential demand for democratic rights.
