Africa’s historical contribution to global emissions remains comparatively small, yet its communities face mounting climate costs. As world leaders prepare to meet in Türkiye, the credibility of international climate cooperation will depend on whether historical responsibility translates into accessible finance, stronger resilience and measurable action.
The question world leaders need to answer in Antalya
When world leaders, climate negotiators, and international institutions convene in Antalya, Türkiye, from 9 to 20 November 2026 for the 31st United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP31), they will face a familiar challenge: turning international climate commitments into results.
The conference, hosted at the Antalya Expo Center, comes amid growing concerns about climate finance, extreme weather, economic vulnerability, and the unequal distribution of environmental costs.
But one question deserves particular attention:
If industrialised nations accumulated enormous wealth through centuries of carbon-intensive development, why should countries that contributed relatively little to historical emissions bear such a disproportionate share of the financial burden of climate change?
This is not simply an argument about historical injustice. It is a question about international economic responsibility, financial capacity and the future credibility of global climate cooperation.
Across Africa, climate change is already affecting agriculture, water security, infrastructure, public health and livelihoods. Similar pressures confront vulnerable communities in the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific.
The World Meteorological Organization’s State of the Climate in Africa 2025, published on 18 June 2026, reported that extreme weather and climate-related events affected at least 13 million people and caused more than 3,000 reported fatalities across Africa during 2025.
Floods accounted for more than half of reported events. The report also highlighted the continent’s inadequate early-warning infrastructure, with only 40 per cent of African countries having multi-hazard early-warning systems.
These figures reveal the scale of the challenge.
For millions of people, climate change is not a distant environmental forecast. It is a threat to food production, household incomes, clean water, housing and economic security.
COP31 must therefore confront a fundamental contradiction: countries with relatively limited historical contributions to global emissions often face substantial costs protecting themselves against the consequences of industrial development elsewhere.
The issue is not whether developed countries have contributed to climate initiatives. Many have provided financial assistance, technology, scientific cooperation and institutional support.
The question is whether these contributions are sufficient, accessible, predictable and proportionate to the scale of the challenge.
Historical emissions and the wealth of industrialisation
The modern global economy was built through generations of intensive fossil-fuel consumption.
Coal powered factories and railways. Oil transformed transportation and manufacturing. Natural gas supported industrial expansion. Together, these resources helped generate unprecedented productivity, technological advancement and national wealth.
However, carbon dioxide accumulates in the atmosphere. Its consequences extend across national borders and generations.
The distribution of historical emissions is therefore central to any serious discussion about climate responsibility.
Data from the Global Carbon Budget 2025, presented through Our World in Data, show that cumulative fossil-fuel and industrial carbon dioxide emissions between 1750 and 2024 were distributed very unevenly.
The United States accounted for approximately 23.5 per cent of the global total, the European Union (EU-27) 16.3 per cent and China 15.4 per cent. Africa accounted for approximately 2.9 per cent.
These figures exclude emissions from land-use change and should not be interpreted as a complete measure of every country’s contribution to climate change.
Nevertheless, they demonstrate the significant historical imbalance in fossil-fuel and industrial emissions.
The economic implications deserve attention.
Countries that industrialised earlier accumulated substantial infrastructure, technological advantages, financial resources and productive capacity during periods of intensive fossil-fuel consumption.
Many African economies, meanwhile, continue to confront infrastructure deficits, restricted access to affordable capital and limited fiscal space.
This does not remove the responsibility of emerging economies to address their present and future emissions. Nor does it mean that historical emissions alone determine every country’s legal liability.
But a fair international climate-finance framework cannot ignore the relationship between historical contributions, present economic capacity and vulnerability.
These three considerations should inform the distribution of financial responsibilities.
Africa’s climate crisis is also an economic crisis
Climate change is increasingly affecting the foundations of economic development.
Floods destroy roads, bridges, hospitals and schools. Drought reduces agricultural productivity and threatens food security. Extreme heat affects public health and labour productivity. Coastal erosion threatens communities, businesses and critical infrastructure.
The consequences frequently extend beyond the immediate disaster.
A flood can contaminate drinking-water supplies, damage sanitation facilities, interrupt healthcare services and expose communities to additional environmental hazards.
A prolonged drought can affect agriculture, electricity generation, employment and household incomes.
Nigeria illustrates these interconnected risks. Flooding, inadequate drainage, water pollution, coastal vulnerability and pressure on agricultural livelihoods demonstrate why environmental resilience must become a central component of national economic planning.
The WMO’s 2025 assessment provides further evidence of the urgency. More than 13 million people across Africa were affected by extreme weather and climate-related events during the year, while the continent continues to face substantial gaps in early-warning capacity.
The economic consequences are significant.
When governments repeatedly divert scarce resources towards disaster recovery, they have less money available for education, healthcare, infrastructure and industrial development.
Without adequate investment in prevention and adaptation, vulnerable economies can become trapped in cycles of destruction, reconstruction and additional borrowing.
Protecting Africa against climate impacts should therefore not be treated as charity.
It is an investment in economic stability, food security, public health, human security and international prosperity.
The climate-finance gap: commitments versus delivery
International climate negotiations have produced important financial commitments. However, the gap between announced targets and the resources required on the ground remains substantial.
At COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, in November 2024, countries agreed to a New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance.
The agreement established a target of mobilising at least US$300 billion annually for developing countries by 2035, with developed countries taking the lead.
It also called for all actors to work towards scaling up climate finance from public and private sources to at least US$1.3 trillion annually by 2035.
These are important commitments, but they must be understood correctly. The US$300 billion goal and the broader US$1.3 trillion ambition are distinct, interconnected targets involving different sources of finance.
More importantly, neither target automatically resolves the immediate financing challenges confronting vulnerable communities.
The United Nations Environment Programme’s Adaptation Gap Report 2025 estimates that developing countries will require between US$310 billion and US$365 billion annually for climate adaptation by 2035.
Yet international public adaptation finance flows to developing countries amounted to approximately US$26 billion in 2023.
The estimated annual requirements are therefore 12 to 14 times the level of those public finance flows.
This is not merely a statistical gap. It represents flood-protection systems that remain unbuilt, water infrastructure that requires modernisation, agricultural communities without adequate irrigation and settlements lacking effective early-warning systems.
A government cannot construct flood barriers with a diplomatic announcement. Farmers cannot install drought-resilient irrigation systems using financial promises. Communities cannot rebuild damaged hospitals through declarations of international solidarity.
As COP31 approaches, three questions should guide the discussions:
- How much climate finance has actually reached developing countries?
- How much of that financing is provided as grants rather than additional debt?
- What measurable improvements in climate resilience have resulted?
The credibility of international climate cooperation should be judged by the quality of implementation, not simply the scale of announced commitments.
Climate assistance, loss and damage, and legal responsibility
A serious discussion of climate justice must distinguish between development assistance, adaptation finance, loss-and-damage funding and legal compensation.
These mechanisms are related, but they serve different purposes.
Development assistance supports broader economic and social progress. Adaptation finance helps countries prepare for and reduce exposure to climate impacts. Loss-and-damage funding addresses economic and non-economic harms associated with climate impacts that cannot be avoided through mitigation and adaptation alone.
Legal compensation, by contrast, concerns reparation for injury arising from internationally wrongful conduct where the relevant legal requirements are established.
These distinctions are important.
When a country constructs flood-control infrastructure, it is investing in adaptation. When communities receive assistance following devastating climate-related disasters, they may benefit from loss-and-damage financing.
Where the legal requirements for state responsibility are established, compensation may become a separate matter.
The distinction is particularly relevant because vulnerable countries sometimes have to borrow to finance essential climate protection.
Loans can be useful for productive investments where repayment is sustainable. However, requiring already indebted economies to borrow further to protect their populations against climate impacts can deepen their financial vulnerability.
Climate finance should not create another cycle of dependency.
Grants, highly concessional financing and appropriate debt-relief mechanisms should receive greater attention, particularly for countries facing severe climate risks and limited fiscal capacity.
What the International Court of Justice has changed
The international legal debate has also developed significantly.
On 23 July 2025, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered its advisory opinion on the obligations of states in respect of climate change.
The opinion clarified that states have obligations under applicable international law to protect the climate system and that breaches of those obligations may constitute internationally wrongful acts.
Importantly, the Court addressed the legal consequences of such breaches, including the possibility of restitution, compensation and satisfaction under the law of state responsibility.
However, compensation is not automatic.
The Court explained that a sufficiently direct and certain causal connection must be established between an internationally wrongful act and the injury for which reparation is sought.
It did not order developed countries collectively to pay a predetermined amount to Africa or any other region.
Nevertheless, the opinion represents an important development in the international legal framework governing climate responsibility.
For vulnerable countries, it strengthens the legal discussion surrounding accountability for climate-related harm.
For COP31 negotiators, the implication is equally important: political cooperation, climate finance and legal accountability should be treated as complementary areas of international action.
Disagreements over legal responsibility should not become an excuse for delaying urgent financial assistance.
Strengthening the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage
The establishment of the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage was an important achievement in international climate negotiations.
It recognised that some climate-related harms cannot be adequately addressed through emissions reduction and adaptation alone.
However, the fund’s resources remain modest compared with the scale of the challenge.
According to its official funding information, approximately US$822.06 million had been pledged as at 15 March 2026.
This is progress, but pledges must not be confused with money already disbursed to affected communities.
Nor should the fund’s resources be mistaken for a comprehensive solution to the economic and non-economic losses associated with climate change.
COP31 should prioritise additional contributions, faster and more accessible funding procedures, transparent reporting and stronger mechanisms for reaching vulnerable communities.
The fund must also recognise that not every loss can be measured through conventional financial calculations.
The disappearance of culturally significant landscapes, the destruction of ancestral communities and the permanent loss of traditional livelihoods represent consequences that extend beyond the replacement cost of physical assets.
Climate justice must recognise both economic damages and the human consequences of environmental disruption.
Six priorities for COP31 decision-makers
For COP31 to deliver meaningful progress, the following priorities deserve serious consideration by the Presidency, national delegations and international development partners.
- Establish clearer climate-finance delivery schedules.
Long-term commitments should be accompanied by measurable annual milestones, transparent accounting and independent reporting. Governments and development institutions should explain what has been mobilised, what has been delivered and what remains outstanding.
- Expand grant-based and concessional financing.
Essential adaptation projects should not automatically increase the debt burdens of vulnerable countries. Financing arrangements must reflect fiscal capacity, development priorities and the urgency of climate risks.
- Strengthen the loss-and-damage fund.
Additional resources, simplified access procedures and transparent disbursement mechanisms are necessary to ensure that assistance reaches affected communities when it is needed.
- Mobilise innovative sources of climate finance.
Governments should explore carefully designed emissions-related levies, international financial mechanisms, philanthropic contributions and responsible private-sector investment. These approaches must be equitable and should not transfer disproportionate costs to low-income populations.
- Connect climate finance with economic transformation.
Funding should support resilient water infrastructure, renewable electricity, climate-smart agriculture, sustainable manufacturing, environmental monitoring and effective early-warning systems.
The objective should be to protect communities while creating employment, strengthening productive capacity and expanding economic opportunities.
- Improve technology transfer and institutional accountability.
Vulnerable countries require access to appropriate technologies, research partnerships, technical expertise and long-term institutional capacity.
Recipient governments must also strengthen independent auditing, transparent procurement, project evaluation and community participation.
Climate finance will only achieve its purpose when resources reach their intended beneficiaries and produce measurable results.
Africa must become a partner in the next green economy
Climate justice should not be interpreted as an invitation to establish permanent financial dependency.
Its greatest value should be the creation of infrastructure, technology and productive capacity that allow African economies to become more resilient and competitive.
In my earlier article, Climate Change in Africa: Unique Challenges and Global Partnerships for Progress, published by African Leadership Magazine in November 2024, I examined the continent’s distinctive environmental vulnerabilities and the importance of constructive international partnerships.
That position remains relevant.
International cooperation should acknowledge previous achievements while recognising where existing approaches have not delivered sufficient results.
The same principle applies to trade, investment and industrial development.
As I argued in Can Fairer Trade Deliver American Jobs and African Industrial Growth?, international partnerships can create mutual economic benefits when they support productive investment, stronger supply chains and local industrial development.
Climate finance should follow the same principle.
Investment in resilient electricity systems can support manufacturing and employment. Modern water infrastructure can improve public health while creating opportunities for agriculture and industry. Climate-smart farming can protect food production and rural livelihoods.
Africa should not remain merely a recipient of emergency environmental assistance.
It should become an active participant in developing the technologies, institutions and industries that will shape the global green economy.
This is particularly important as demand grows for critical minerals, renewable energy technologies, artificial intelligence infrastructure and advanced manufacturing.
The global energy transition must not reproduce the inequalities of earlier industrial revolutions, in which environmental burdens were concentrated in poorer regions while much of the economic value accumulated elsewhere.
African countries must have a greater stake in the processing, manufacturing, technological innovation and value creation associated with the transition.
Climate justice must therefore address both the consequences of historical emissions and the distribution of opportunities in the emerging low-carbon economy.
COP31 and the test of international credibility
The world does not lack scientific evidence about climate change. Nor does it lack international declarations recognising the urgency of action.
What remains contested is how responsibilities should be distributed, how financial commitments should be fulfilled and how vulnerable countries can obtain the resources required to protect their populations.
Industrialised countries face budgetary constraints and competing domestic priorities. Emerging economies must also address their growing contribution to global emissions.
These realities deserve recognition. But they cannot justify indefinite postponement of effective international action.
A credible COP31 outcome should strengthen adaptation finance, improve access to loss-and-damage resources, advance transparent financial reporting and promote investments capable of delivering lasting economic resilience.
It should also advance stronger emissions reductions. Adaptation and compensation cannot replace the urgent need to prevent further warming.
The world needs both a fairer response to existing climate harm and determined action to reduce future risks.
The Antalya conference offers an opportunity to demonstrate that these objectives can reinforce one another.
The world’s prosperity must come with responsibility
For more than two centuries, industrialisation transformed economies, reshaped societies and generated extraordinary wealth.
Its achievements deserve recognition. But its environmental consequences cannot be separated from the history of that prosperity.
Africa and other climate-vulnerable regions are not asking the international community to abandon economic growth or accept unlimited financial obligations.
They are demanding a fairer, evidence-based and accountable framework for sharing the costs of a global crisis.
The countries least responsible for historical emissions should not be left to bear disproportionate costs of protecting their people, infrastructure and economies.
Before COP31 begins, world leaders must confront this uncomfortable truth.
The conference should deliver more than another declaration of ambition. It should establish stronger mechanisms for financing adaptation, supporting communities experiencing loss and damage, transferring appropriate technologies and creating economic opportunities across vulnerable regions.
History will not judge COP31 solely by the language of its final declaration.
It will judge whether governments honoured commitments, protected vulnerable populations and helped build an international climate system grounded in fairness, responsibility and measurable results.
The world grew rich on carbon. Now it must demonstrate that prosperity can also produce responsibility.
Joshua Rufus Abadi, PhD, is an environmental engineering specialist, researcher and international commentator whose work focuses on water contamination, environmental remediation, climate resilience, sustainable development and international environmental policy.
