Guinea’s political trajectory has reached another decisive inflection point. On 21–22 September 2025 Guineans went to the polls in a referendum on a draft constitution that, according to provisional results announced by the electoral authorities, was approved by an overwhelming majority. Reuters had reported that the figures released so far show roughly 90.6 percent in favour, with turnout reported at more than 70 percent of registered voters, a result that, on paper, clears the path for a constitution that removes key post-coup restrictions and would allow the leader of the 2021 coup, Mamady Doumbouya, or other members of the transitional administration, to seek the presidency.
That outcome has prompted sharply divergent readings at home and abroad: supporters frame the vote as a necessary reset that opens the way toward elections and stability; critics view it as a legitimising device for a military élite that has already prolonged its hold on power.
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The present constitutional crisis is rooted in the coup of 5 September 2021, when the Special Forces under then-commander Mamady Doumbouya seized power, dissolved the government and the constitution, and detained President Alpha Condé. Doumbouya was formally sworn in as interim president on 1 October 2021 with public pledges to return Guinea to civilian rule.
The transitional authorities initially set public timetables, most notably a promise that civilian rule would be restored by 31 December 2024, yet those deadlines were missed, and the timetable repeatedly shifted. In the run-up to the referendum, the transition charter that had barred members of the transitional government from seeking elected office was removed from the draft constitution, a change that critics say directly benefits those who currently wield power.
What the Draft Constitution Actually changes
The draft constitution advanced in the referendum does not simply re-package old text. According to provisional reporting, it extends the presidential term from five to seven years while allowing re-election, establishes an upper chamber (a Senate) with a significant portion of members appointed by the president, and deletes or overrides clauses in the post-coup charter that had prohibited transitional leaders from contesting future elections. Those institutional changes reshape the rules of political competition in a way that, even if legally salvaged, will materially alter the distribution of power in Guinea’s polity. The draft’s core amendments and the official vote statistics were widely reported by international agencies covering the count. Turnout, results and contestation
The electoral body’s early tallies, more than 4.8 million votes counted from a registry of roughly 6.6–6.7 million voters produced a turnout rate the authorities say comfortably exceeded the threshold required to validate the referendum. Opposition leaders and many civil society actors, however, decried the vote as orchestrated in an environment in which key political parties were suspended, critical media licenses were revoked and civic freedoms had been markedly narrowed. Some opposition figures chose to boycott the referendum; others accused the state of coercive practices and administrative bias. International and regional observers were present in varying capacities, and regional bodies such as ECOWAS publicly engaged with the process; their statements and the scope of their observation will shape longer-term judgments about the referendum’s credibility.
Guinea is not a marginal actor in global commodity markets. It sits on the world’s largest known bauxite reserves, the ore that feeds the aluminium industry, and minerals account for a very large share of export revenues and government income. The stability or instability of Guinea therefore carries consequences beyond Conakry: supply, investor confidence, and the geopolitics of resource access are all implicated. International investors, mining companies and foreign governments will be watching how constitutional and institutional changes affect contract certainty, rule of law and the security of long-term projects. A constitution that concentrates power in an executive with the capacity to appoint a significant part of the legislature or upper chamber may tilt the balance in future resource governance debates and licensing disputes.
Is This a Path Back to Civilian Rule?
Proponents of the referendum argue that statutory normalization, a written constitution, new electoral institutions and a formalised timetable is a necessary precondition for elections and a functioning civilian polity. They point to a public yearning for stability after years of political volatility and to visible projects or reforms the junta claims as successes. For many Guineans weary of frequent political upheaval, a clear constitutional framework can seem like the most direct route back to predictable governance.
Sceptics, however, see the changes differently. Removing explicit prohibitions on transitional leaders running for office, lengthening terms, and increasing presidential appointment powers can be read as structural adjustments that favour an incumbent or incumbent-aligned actors. Where opposition parties are suspended, civil liberties constrained and credible reports of rights violations persist, formal constitutional change alone cannot substitute for the political pluralism and institutional checks that underpin meaningful democracy. The central question is not merely whether there will be elections, but whether those elections will be free, fair and inclusive in an environment that protects dissent and guarantees a level playing field. Regional and international response: the global framework
Guinea’s referendum must be read alongside regional and continental norms that guard against unconstitutional changes of government and demand timely returns to civilian rule. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has a long-standing Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, adopted in 2001, which obliges members to oppose and respond to coups, including suspension and sanctions where appropriate. The African Union likewise has adopted the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007) and has, in practice, suspended and sanctioned member states following coups. In addition, Guinea is a party to broader international instruments that require respect for civil and political rights, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. How regional and international actors frame their engagement, whether through conditional recognition, sanctions, technical support for electoral processes or more punitive measures will materially influence Guinea’s next chapter.
Risks, Scenarios and the Hard Choices Ahead
Three broad scenarios now present themselves. The first is a relatively smooth transition in which the new constitution is followed by genuinely competitive national elections, full re-engagement with regional bodies, and a restoration of civil liberties. This outcome would require the transitional authorities to rapidly rebuild trust by allowing the return of suspended parties, guaranteeing media freedoms, instituting credible investigations into reported abuses and inviting robust, transparent observation.
The second scenario is a managed transition: elections occur but in a constrained environment that advantages the incumbent camp and leaves opposition movements weakened; Guinea would then move into a semi-authoritarian equilibrium with constitutional veneers masking entrenched power. The third scenario is further polarisation, conflict and international isolation if repression intensifies and domestic grievances ferment; such an outcome would impose high human and economic costs and would complicate international partnerships in mining and security.
Practical measures that could reduce risk and foster credibility include independent, internationally supported investigations into alleged rights violations; restoration of civic and media freedoms in the immediate aftermath of the vote; unimpeded registration and campaigning for all political parties; transparent management of electoral rolls; and genuine, visible guarantees for the impartiality of electoral administration. Absent those measures, legalistic constitutional changes will do little to answer the deeper problem: a deficit of trust between rulers and the ruled.
Reading the Constitution Beyond the Text
Constitutions matter not only for what they say but for the political bargains they reveal. Guinea’s referendum has produced a new legal text that can either be a foundation for credible, inclusive politics or a legal instrument that entrenches advantage for a narrow group. The crucial test will come not on paper but in practice.
Will the authorities allow a fully plural and competitive electoral environment, investigate the abuses that have narrowed political space, and accept the constraints that a genuinely democratic order imposes on executive ambition? If they do, the constitution can be the scaffold of a return to civilian rule. If they do not, it risks becoming the formal cover for a prolonged consolidation of power that democratic reformers had hoped to prevent. The world will be watching whether Guinea chooses the hard work of democratic restoration or the easier path of legalised incumbency.
