Africa’s political freedom score improved in 2026, but does stronger electoral integrity necessarily mean stronger democratic institutions? The second edition of the Liberalist Centre’s Freedom in Africa (F(in)AR) Index suggests that progress is being made, while exposing persistent weaknesses in judicial independence, civil liberties and public confidence in democratic governance.
Released in Abuja on 31 October 2026, the index reports that Africa’s average political freedom score rose from 47 in 2025 to 52.8 in 2026. Its assessment covers six indicators: electoral integrity, freedom of speech, press freedom, freedom of assembly, judicial independence, and protection from oppression and torture.
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Electoral integrity recorded the greatest improvement, with its continental average increasing from 4.0 to 5.2 out of 10. Ghana’s score rose from 6.8 to 9.5, Morocco’s from 2.9 to 7.9, and Côte d’Ivoire’s from 1.8 to 6.0. Seychelles led the overall political freedom ranking at 9.2, followed by Cabo Verde at 9.0, Ghana and Mauritius at 8.8 each, and South Africa at 8.7.
These gains are significant, particularly in a region where electoral credibility remains central to political stability and public trust. However, the index relies entirely on secondary data from existing international and African datasets rather than conducting independent surveys. Its findings therefore depend on the coverage, quality and reference periods of those underlying sources. The overall score offers a comparative assessment, not a complete account of how citizens experience political freedom.
Judicial independence remains the most concerning indicator. Its continental average stood at just 4.0 out of 10, the lowest among the six measures. Nigeria recorded a particularly sharp decline, falling from 6.1 in 2025 to 2.9 in 2026. By comparison, Seychelles scored 9.9, while The Gambia improved from 7.0 to 8.1 and Benin from 4.9 to 7.8.
The contrast highlights a fundamental challenge: elections can improve without corresponding progress in the institutions responsible for protecting constitutional rights and restraining executive power. Without independent courts, electoral victories and legal protections may offer limited guarantees when citizens challenge government decisions or seek redress.
Other indicators reveal a mixed picture. Press freedom averaged 6.4, while freedom of assembly scored 5.8 and freedom of speech 5.7. The Gambia recorded a notable improvement in freedom of speech, rising from 5.8 to 8.7, while Nigeria was among the countries registering gains in freedom of assembly. Yet these improvements coexist with restrictions on journalists, demonstrations and civic organisations in several countries.
External assessments provide important context. Freedom House’s 2026 report found that political rights and civil liberties deteriorated in 18 of Africa’s 54 countries during 2025, while only 11 recorded improvements. The CIVICUS Monitor, which assesses conditions for freedom of association, peaceful assembly and expression, rates civic space as repressed in countries including Nigeria, Cameroon, Rwanda, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, and closed in Sudan and Djibouti. These assessments examine different dimensions of freedom, but together they show why improvements in a continental index should not obscure country-level restrictions.
Burkina Faso illustrates the depth of the challenge. CIVICUS reported that authorities dissolved 118 civil society organisations in April 2026 and suspended another 564 between April and early May. By June, more than 1,174 organisations had reportedly been suspended or dissolved. Political parties were also dissolved in January 2026. These developments demonstrate how quickly the space for organised civic participation can contract, particularly under military rule.
Public opinion adds another dimension. Afrobarometer’s 2024/2025 survey across 38 African countries found that 64% of respondents preferred democracy, but only 36% expressed a full demand for democracy, meaning they preferred democratic government while rejecting one-person, one-party and military rule. That proportion has declined by 10 percentage points over the past decade across 29 countries surveyed consistently. Only 47% considered their country a democracy, while 38% were satisfied with how democracy worked. Afrobarometer associates the declining commitment to democracy with increasingly negative assessments of government performance.
The Sahel underscores the regional implications. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have withdrawn from ECOWAS and established the Alliance of Sahel States, complicating regional efforts to promote democratic transitions and uphold shared governance standards. The weakening of regional cooperation comes at a time when political instability and restrictions on civic participation require sustained diplomatic engagement.
The African Union’s Agenda 2063 implementation process faces its own challenges. In June 2026, the AU Commission reported continental performance at 53%, while identifying gaps between planning and budgeting and weaknesses in implementation capacity. The figure points to a broader governance concern: commitments and policy frameworks must translate into measurable improvements in citizens’ lives.
The F(in)AR 2026 findings offer a positive indication that electoral processes and some aspects of political freedom are improving across parts of Africa. But the low judicial independence score, declining public confidence and documented restrictions on civic space show that progress remains uneven.
Ultimately, democratic progress must be measured beyond elections and aggregate scores. It depends on whether citizens can choose their leaders, question public officials, organise peacefully, access independent courts and hold governments accountable without intimidation. The index provides a useful comparative reference, but the durability of Africa’s democratic gains will depend on whether its institutions can protect those freedoms consistently.
