Across Africa, a shift is taking place in how regional diplomacy and international negotiations are being shaped. While governments and state institutions have traditionally led the continent’s foreign relations and conflict resolution efforts, a growing number of non-state actors, ranging from NGOs and religious institutions to private companies and ethnic groups are playing increasingly influential roles.
These groups are no longer operating on the margins. In many countries, they have become central to peace talks, humanitarian responses, and regional cooperation. Whether through grassroots networks, financial leverage, or moral authority, non-state actors are now contributing directly to outcomes once considered the sole domain of governments. Their rise is prompting questions about how diplomacy is conducted and who now speaks for communities in conflict, development, and integration processes.
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The African Union (AU) continues to serve as the continent’s foremost diplomatic platform, coordinating official responses to security, governance, and integration matters. However, its Peace and Security Council and associated mechanisms are increasingly engaging with external stakeholders. In recognition of this shift, the AU adopted the “Guidelines on Engagement with Non-State Actors” in 2023. The document encourages member states to legally recognise the contributions of civil society organisations (CSOs), religious leaders, the private sector, and traditional authorities in conflict mediation, early warning systems, and peacebuilding.
In countries such as Burkina Faso, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the AU has partnered with local peace committees and civil society platforms to monitor ceasefires, prevent electoral violence, and support disarmament processes. These actors often possess knowledge of local dynamics and cultural legitimacy that formal institutions lack. Their involvement has moved from optional to essential, especially in fragile and post-conflict environments.
This evolution is also visible in the AU’s Silencing the Guns by 2030 initiative, where non-state actors are critical to its success. Community-led campaigns in the Sahel, for instance, have proven more effective in preventing youth radicalisation than military-led strategies alone. The AU Commission has acknowledged that engaging local religious leaders and CSOs is indispensable to curbing the spread of extremist ideologies.
Financial Leverage and Development Diplomacy
The influence of non-state actors is not limited to soft power, it is backed by significant financial flows. A portion of this funding has been used to support diplomatic and conflict resolution functions. For example, in Sudan, international donors, including the EU and Norway channelled over $30 million in 2022–2023 to civil society platforms working on peacebuilding and transitional governance following the military coup. These local actors were instrumental in bringing opposition groups to the negotiation tables and providing community buy-in for national dialogues.
Private sector actors are also becoming de facto diplomats in areas where economic interests intersect with political stability. In the Horn of Africa, companies in telecommunications, banking, and logistics have joined efforts to stabilise trade corridors by funding community dialogues and infrastructure protection.
In the mining-rich regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo, private firms are negotiating not just with government ministers but with local chiefs and community representatives, who now act as gatekeepers to political stability and social licence to operate. These interactions, although informal, are influencing national decision-making and bilateral relations.
The Role of Religious Leaders in Conflict Mediation
Faith-based actors have played prominent roles in some of the continent’s most complex conflicts. In South Sudan, the South Sudan Council of Churches, in collaboration with IGAD and the Vatican, facilitated a number of informal peace dialogues that ultimately contributed to the 2018 revitalised peace agreement. Their moral authority and ability to mobilise followers granted them access to combatants and political leaders alike.
In Nigeria, religious groups have acted both as peacebuilders and political watchdogs. Following the 2023 general elections, tensions in several states were reduced due to direct interventions by faith leaders from the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and the Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI). Their messages urging restraint and fairness helped prevent outbreaks of violence in parts of the North and South-East.
Moreover, religious institutions are often involved in cross-border peacebuilding. The Interfaith Council of the Great Lakes Region, comprising clerics from Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC, has been instrumental in promoting reconciliation efforts where formal state dialogue has stalled.
These religious actors have also been critical in mediating refugee reintegration processes. For instance, in Cameroon’s Far North Region, imams and pastors have helped reintegrate former Boko Haram fighters by overseeing community forgiveness and reintegration ceremonies—activities that lie outside the scope of conventional diplomacy but are essential to long-term peace.
Ethnic and Traditional Institutions as Political Interlocutors
In regions where ethnic identities influence political dynamics, traditional and ethnic leaders are becoming central to diplomatic outcomes. This is particularly evident in Ethiopia, where sub-national entities often represent distinct ethnic constituencies. During the Tigray conflict, elders and civil society actors from the Amhara and Tigray communities were involved in the African Union-led peace process, providing access and intelligence that facilitated the cessation of hostilities agreement signed in Pretoria in November 2022.
In Mali and Niger, Tuareg federations have participated in negotiations with both governments and international observers. These groups, though non-state in structure, control territory and wield significant political power. Their buy-in has often determined the success or failure of peace processes in the Sahel.
Meanwhile, in countries like Ghana and Botswana, traditional chiefs remain respected institutions of governance. They are often consulted during negotiations over land, environmental agreements, and communal conflicts. In Ghana, the National House of Chiefs is occasionally invited by government agencies to mediate between multinational companies and affected communities in extractive zones.
Formalising Non-State Participation Through Global and Continental Frameworks
The global diplomatic architecture is gradually adjusting to the rise of these actors. The United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development calls for inclusive partnerships with civil society and private sector stakeholders. Its Sustainable Development Goal 16 highlights the need for just, inclusive, and accountable institutions, explicitly inviting the participation of actors beyond the state.
On the continental level, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), adopted by the AU, encourages member states to protect civic space and ensure participatory governance. Article 27 of the Charter urges governments to establish mechanisms for engaging with non-state actors in policy formulation, peacebuilding, and development planning.
The AU Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) serves as the official platform for civil society engagement with the AU. It currently includes over 150 accredited organisations representing sectors such as gender, youth, health, and governance. Although ECOSOCC has faced criticisms for limited impact, it remains one of the few continental spaces where non-state actors can formally contribute to Africa’s regional policy debates.
Recognising a Multi-Actor Reality
The growing influence of non-state actors across Africa is reshaping traditional notions of diplomacy. These actors are not displacing governments, but they are contributing to a broader, more inclusive form of engagement, one that reflects the realities of fragmented governance, rising civic awareness, and the need for multi-level cooperation.
International donors, regional bodies, and African governments increasingly recognise that peace and development cannot be delivered through state channels alone. Involving non-state actors is no longer a question of courtesy—it is a question of strategy. Whether it is civil society organisations bridging gaps in post-conflict recovery, faith leaders rebuilding trust, or businesses enabling economic diplomacy, these groups are now part of the machinery of regional influence.
Africa’s diplomatic landscape is no longer confined to embassies and government ministries. It now includes NGOs operating in refugee camps, religious leaders negotiating behind closed doors, and companies forging regional integration from the ground up. The sooner this reality is fully acknowledged and supported through legal frameworks and policy inclusion, the more resilient and responsive African diplomacy will become.
